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OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORALITY OF LAW
By JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.t

THE ORAL

presentations of Professors Cohen and Dworkin on
the evening of the symposium were long and involved. At the
expense of possible injustice to both, I will deal with their efforts
summarily.
The remarks of Professor Cohen seemed to accomplish little
in the way of genuine contribution to the rich interchange of ideas
that was promised. The greater part of Professor Cohen's effort was
a pedestrian defense of positivism followed by what seemed to be a
quibble concerning the use of the term "morality" used by Professor
Fuller to describe the principles of legality in his book. Professor
Dworkin's attack was much more direct, though colored by what
must have been very sophisticated humor. The most meaningful part
of the Dworkin effort was his attempt to show that Fuller's principles
of legality had nothing to do with morality. He attempted to do this
by isolating a few of the principles and illustrating that each was compatible with great iniquity. Even this confrontation, however, did
not veil the fact that Dworkin and certainly Cohen do not communicate
with Professor Fuller.
Thus, when the Cohen-Dworkin attack ceased, the sentimental
favorite was Professor Fuller. Rather than winning by default, Fuller
proceeded to articulate his defense in a fashion which shed more light
on the basic theme of his book. It became clear, at least to this observer,
that Fuller was saying more about substantive natural law than a
casual reading of his book discloses.
One could come away from the book feeling that Fuller's willingness to identify substantive natural law was relegated to the notion
of opening up, maintaining and preserving the channels of communication among men. However, a closer reading of the book and a careful
consideration of his remarks at the symposium indicate that Fuller has
said much more about the external morality of law.
Orally, Fuller emphasized his contention that the principles of
legality have a greater affinity for good than for evil. It is this contention, the conclusion of the author's notion of the interaction between
the internal and external moralities of law, which has given rise to the
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most serious attack upon his thesis. Fuller recognizes this attack
in the last chapter of his book by quoting from H. L. A. Hart's The
Concept of Law: ". . . if this is what the necessary connexion of law
and morality means, we may accept it. It is unfortunately compatible
with very great iniquity."' Fuller criticizes this remark in two ways.
First, if Hart means that it is possible to conceive of an evil monarch
who pursues the most iniquitous ends while preserving a genuine respect
for the principles of legality, the observation is not in keeping with
the aim of Hart's book. Secondly, if Hart means that there are
historical examples of faithful adherence to the internal morality of
law combined with a brutal indifference to justice and human welfare,
the absence of such examples in the book precludes any meaningful
discussion. The minimal inference to be drawn from these criticisms
is that Fuller assumes that iniquitous substantive ends are unlikely
to be pursued through adherence to the internal morality of law. Thus',
if the sovereign power wishes to accomplish evil goals, it is unlikely
to make the attempt by promulgating a set of general, clear, prospective,
uncontradictory rules which require only what is possible, are not
frequently changed and which are administered in accordance with
their declaration. The obvious question is, why? If the answer is
that the sovereign's effort will be unsuccessful because the evil substantive aims will be unacceptable to the governed, this means that
the governed are capable of making a meaningful appraisal of the
rule. Professor Fuller recognizes this fact in his book when he notes
the deep affinity between legality and justice. Thus, "acting by known
rule is a precondition for any meaningful appraisal of the justice
of law." 2 Here, Professor Fuller recognizes the fact that the demands
of the internal morality of law are not always ethically neutral though
they may seem so at first blush and though they are neutral over
a wide range of substantive issues.
The most important area in which the demands of legality are
not neutral is suggested by Professor Fuller in terms of the nature
of man. He insists upon viewing man as a rational, responsible agent
capable of understanding and following rules and answering for his
defaults. He concludes that "every departure from the law's inner
morality is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent." 3
It occurs to this observer that these important suggestions result
in a theory of substantive natural law which is broader than that which
1. HART, THE CONCEPT or LAW, 202 (1961).
2. FULLER, THE MORALITY or LAw, 157 (1964).

3. Id. at 162.
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the author expressly admits. Not only is he suggesting that "procedural" natural law (the internal morality) gives rise to a certain
minimum of substantive morality, but, in addition, he implies that the
external morality of law must adhere to the substantive principles
which can be derived from his analysis of the nature of man. He
makes no attempt to expressly suggest any principles of substantive
natural law except one, which he obviously intends only as a substitute
for H. L. A. Hart's minimum content.' Neither does he suggest that
it is impossible to posit such a substantive theory. He simply implies
that he has not undertaken to do so in his book. However, if one
agrees with the author's analysis of man's nature, does it not follow
that any substantive aim which is not in accordance with that nature
is just as much an affront to man's dignity as is a departure from the
law's inner morality? If Fuller's answer is that he has considered the
nature of man only in relation to the internal morality of law, certainly one would expect that the author would not conclude that man's
nature is different if viewed from the standpoint of external morality.
While Fuller may contend that he has simply not addressed himself
to this question, has he not at least solidly established his basis for
inquiry in this area?
The principles of legal morality are consistent with man's nature
as viewed by the author. However, his further conclusion is that the
principles of legality have a greater affinity for good than for evil. This
is not simply because faithful adherence to the internal morality of
law will permit a meaningful appraisal of the justice of law according
to some unknown standard. Rather, if the lawmaker adheres to the
principles of legality, the meaningful appraisal can be made according
to the standard suggested by the author himself : the rational, responsible
free-will nature of man. The shortcoming evidenced by a failure to
accept this basic proposition is unfortunate in two ways. First, it
has given rise to the criticism that Fuller has probably abandoned all
hope of formulating a substantive natural-law theory, 5 a proposition
which this observer rejects. Secondly, if he had simply indicated the
suggested basis for a substantive theory, perhaps no more or even
fewer critics would have agreed, but the author would have been
less susceptible to attack. If he had enunciated this basic proposition
of substantive natural law, no legitimate complaint could have been
entered concerning his failure to develop it, since he did not address
himself to such a task.
4. Id. at 184-86.
5. Savarese, Book Review, 53 Gxo. L. J. 250, 257 (1964).
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What has been said should not detract from the significant contribution which Professor Fuller has made in his book and continued
in his oral presentation at the symposium. His emphasis upon the
principles of legality will go far in making further explorations of this
long neglected area more significant. Perhaps more than anything else,
the author's focus upon the subject matter and the insights which he
has developed have clearly shown the need for further exploration.
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